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Tighter times mean that Russia can no longer continue to
ignore the corruption which is endemic to nearly every aspect
of society.
Jun 25 2012
Russia is well known for the systemic corruption that characterises its society, politics and
institutions. But this may be about to change. Mark Galeotti argues that as Russia moves
on from its period of post-Soviet state-rebuilding, the sheer costs of corruption and pressure
from Russia’s new middle classes may force the government to take tougher action.
It’s a cliché to say that corruption is a serious problem for today’s Russia. Of course, it’s true:
a recent opinion survey by pollsters VTsIOM found that corruption regarded as the greatest
constraint on Russia’s development. Former President Dmitry Medvedev admitted in his
swansong TV interview that while “it would be a massive exaggeration to say that nothing is
being done,” actual results had been “modest.” Why? “Officials are a corporation. They don’t want anyone to
interfere in their business.”
This was a striking admission, but graft does not just bubble up out of individual and factional greed; it is a
time-honoured tool of state-building that successive administrations have knowingly wielded. After all,
corruption is a cheap and easy way to buy and reward national and local elites. Sometimes it also humanises
systems, allowing the entrepreneurial and the desperate alike some hope of being able to access goods, jobs
and services otherwise closed to them.
The questions are rather about how and when a country outgrows this primal stage of state-building – and
who leads the change. Russia’s paradox was that it had to create itself in the 1990s, but on relatively
advanced social and cultural foundations. This was rather a process of state-rebuilding, something that has
been much less extensively studied.
Successive Russian governments have paid lip service to the problem while doing little to address it on a
systemic level. Where senior figures have been prosecuted, this has tended to be when they fell out of
political favour rather than because they were any more venal than their peers. However, this laissez-faire
approach may have to change, for two main reasons.
First of all, the government is increasingly aware of the extent to
Credit: World Economic Forum (Creative
Commons BY SA)
First of all, the government is increasingly aware of the extent to
which corruption is undermining and debilitating it. For a regime so
concerned with security and defence, for example, Main Military
Prosecutor Fridinsky’s assertion that 20% of the State Defence
Order is stolen through kickbacks and embezzlement is unwelcome
news. That is equivalent to all the money Russia spends on
employment programmes and supporting the jobless in a year. The
cost of corruption matters all the more when times are tighter and
the old standbys of oil and gas export revenues less able to mask
domestic weaknesses. The Russian economy is set to grow at a
respectable 4% this year, but this will not be enough to cover the
ambitious spending pledges President Vladimir Putin made
simultaneously to address the competing needs of the state, the elite
and society.
Something will have to give; in the past, the brunt of cuts would fall
on the masses, but now Putin is facing unprecedented political
pressure. A new generation of Russians who have benefitted from
the past twenty years of progress are calling for political change.
However, from the Kremlin’s point of view, the threat is not so much
the predominantly middle-class protesters marching in Moscow but
the possibility that they could find common cause with ordinary
Russians.
In March, for example, activist Evgeny Urlashov won mayoral
elections in the city of Yaroslavl not by campaigning on national
issues but practical local concerns. Many of these, in some form or
another, stem from corruption: prices in local shops inflated by the need to pay off officials, construction work
done badly and late because contracts went to those offering the biggest bribes, and so forth. In other words,
the issue of corruption may prove to be central to the narrative by which the comfortable metropolitan
protesters of today may win themselves a mass constituency tomorrow.
However, what Putin calls “systemic corruption” is not just endemic, it is central to the process whereby the
Kremlin co-opts varied sectional and regional elites. On a recent trip to Moscow, for example, I spoke with a
middle-ranking official within the security apparatus who was thoroughly disillusioned by Putin but feels he
has no alternative but to support him precisely because he has accumulated such wealth through tacitly-
sanctioned embezzlement. Likewise, there are whole regional leaderships whose loyal adherence to the
Kremlin line is bought and paid for in this manner.
The rebuilding of Russia has happened at a break-neck pace; from orphan of a collapsed empire through
anarchic basket-case to relatively stable if authoritarian modern state in two busy decades. However, even if
the Kremlin does decide to rise to the challenge of truly addressing corruption – and this is by no means
guaranteed, as in a crisis Putin’s instincts seem to be to consolidate rather than reform – then how can it
likewise compress a process which in the West often took decades? Corruption is the mortar holding the
Kremlin walls together; can Putin really scrape it out and replace it without bringing the whole structure
tumbling down?
On 20 June, Alexander Lebedev, Mark Galeotti and Vladimir Ashurkov discussed corruption in Russia, at the
Chatham House event Russia’s Rotten Core: Money, Politics and the Rule of Law. Click here to listen to the
podcast.
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